The recently released report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (Romanow Report) once again raised the issue of pharmaceutical patents (2) . Romanow was critical of the practice of "evergreening," in which manufacturers of brand name drugs make variations to existing drugs in order to extend their patent coverage. This practice delays the ability of generic manufacturers to develop cheaper products for the marketplace and it is a questionable outcome of Canada's patent law. Furthermore, regulations under the patent law require generic drug manufacturers to demonstrate that their product is not infringing on a patent held by another drug manufacturer rather than putting the onus on the patent drug manufacturer to show that their patent has been infringed-what is referred to as the notice of compliance regulations. Suggestions have been made that this leads to "preemptory" lawsuits from patented drug manufacturers as a way of delaying the approval of generic drugs.
Romanow recommended that the federal government examine the issue of "what constitutes a legitimate extension of patent protection."
Romanow's report addresses only one of the many contemporary debates in Canada about intellectual property rights (IPRs) and patent protection. Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D), the organization representing the multinational companies with subsidiaries in Canada (along with some Canadian-owned biotechnology companies), is currently arguing for better data protection on research, better enforcement of IPRs, and patent term restoration. It makes the point that the United States, the European Union, and Japan offer patent term restoration of up to five years, in recognition of the time needed for clinical development and the delays in getting the regulatory approval (3) . In return for movement on these and other issues, the industry is promising to substantially increase investment in research and development with the ultimate goal of achieving a pharmaceutical innovation ranking of fifth or higher among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development members (4) . (Interestingly, no firm time commitment is put on this promise.)
In order to decide on a future course of action that Canada should take on IPRs as they apply to pharmaceuticals, it is useful to review downstream effects in Canada that resulted from C-22 and C-91. This article first examines changes in employment, in Canada's balance of trade in pharmaceuticals, in investment in research and development, and in drug expenditures. Second, I review the arguments advanced by the pharmaceutical industry in favor of stronger protection for IPRs. Recently, there have been complaints made against Canada at the World Trade Organization (WTO) regarding pharmaceutical IPRs, and these and other contemporary issues are the subject of the third section. The fourth section deals with the second-draft text agreement of the Free Trade Area of the Americas that will, if implemented, have significant repercussions for pharmaceutical IPRs. Patents distort the marketplace for drugs in a number of ways, and in the fifth section I briefly touch on half a dozen of these. The article concludes with some alternative recommendations on the future of IPRs.
THE ENVIRONMENT SINCE 1987
Changes to Employment Increases in employment are often cited by the multinational industry as one benefit of liberalizing Canadian patent laws. According to figures in the latest publication from Rx&D, employment by member companies went from 14,521 in 1987 to 20,990 in 1999 (5) . However, overall employment has increased relatively little in the pharmaceutical industry since 1990, when it stood at 20,426 (6) .
Up-to-date employment figures for the generics industry are not available, but from 1990 to 1995, employment in this sector rose from 1,531 to 3,631 for an annual increase of just over 27 percent (7) . In the same time period, the number of people employed in the multinational sector went up by 1,971 (8) , less than the increase for the generics companies, and on an annual basis the rate of rise in employment was just 2.5 percent.
The number of people employed in research and development in the pharmaceutical industry has definitely increased following the restriction and then elimination of compulsory licensing, but the 3,580 people employed in this area in 2000 (9) is still considerably short of the 4,000 sales representatives working for the multinational pharmaceutical companies in 1995 (10) .
Changes in Balance of Pharmaceutical Trade
From 1983 to 1987 the Canadian deficit in the trade of pharmaceuticals grew from $366 million to $491 million (all amounts in Canadian dollars unless noted otherwise). After Canada became a party to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States in 1987, the trade deficit went from $624 million to $1,464 million in 1993. By 1996, Canada had the second largest trade deficit in pharmaceuticals of the 29 OECD countries (11) , and since inception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994) and the WTO (1995) the deficit has gone from $1,612 million in 1994 to $4,059 million in 2000 (12, 13) .
Dramatic as these figures are, they do not give a true picture of how much Canada has come to depend on imports to supply its pharmaceutical needs. Table 1 shows the import penetration of the Canadian domestic market for the three time periods 1983-1987, 1988-1993, and 1994-2000. In 1983, imports were 18 percent of the Canadian market, in 1993 they were more than 34 percent, and by 2000 more than three-quarters of the market was made up of imports. Most imports are fine chemicals that form the active ingredients in the medications that we use. Therefore, coincident with the change in the Canadian patent laws there has been a failure to expand the underdeveloped fine chemical industry, and pharmaceutical manufacturing has taken on more of an assembly-line nature whereby ingredients are combined into their final form.
Changes in Investment in Research and Development
The pharmaceutical industry made significant investments in research and development (R&D) after the changes in Canadian patent laws, going from 6.5 percent of sales in 1988 to a high of 12.9 percent in 1997, but these advances have been eroding over the past five years, and the 2002 figure was 9.9 percent (14) . Since 1995, Canadian investment in R&D, as a percentage of sales, has remained significantly below the levels in six of the seven countries that the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board uses for price comparisons (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) (15) . Not only is Canada behind these major industrial countries, but Canadian R&D is also lower than that in most smaller European countries (15) .
It is not just overall R&D spending that is of concern. More significantly, basic research and development in Canada has been dropping as a percentage of total R&D. In 1990, basic R&D was 27.2 percent of the total; by 2002 it was just 17.6 percent (14) . At that level, Canada remains substantially behind, for example, the United Kingdom (24.5 percent) and the United States (36 percent) (15) .
Changes in Prescription Costs and Drug Spending
The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB) was established as part of Bill C-22 to protect consumer interests, with powers to limit the introductory prices for new patented drugs and prevent prices for existing patented drugs from rising by more than the rate of inflation. Within this context the PMPRB has been a success. Its 2003 report demonstrates that between 1988 and 2002 the rate of 240 / Lexchin inflation for the price of patented medications has risen by just 0.6 percent per year. Additionally, in 1987, Canadian prices for patented medications were 23 percent above the mean in seven other countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), but by 2001 prices were 5 percent below the average in those same seven countries (14) . However, these figures hide a basic failure in the ability of the PMPRB to protect consumers from high prices when it comes to the price they pay for a prescription. The price of a prescription for nonpatented medications increased 2.3 percent annually from 1997 to 2001, to a level of $22.94 in 2001. On the other hand, during the same period patented medication prices went up at 6.2 percent annually, to a value of $84.36 in 2001 (16) . Physicians have been substituting these newer, more expensive drugs for older, less costly ones, leading to the rise in the cost of the average prescription: between 1997 and 2002, sales of patented medications as a proportion of total sales rose from 52.3 to 67.4 percent (14) .
The prescribing of newer, more expensive drugs in place of older, less expensive, but not necessarily less effective, ones was not something that started in 1987. The practice was well entrenched when Canada had compulsory licensing. What is different is that since Bill C-91 the introduction of generic competitors for new patented medications has been significantly delayed. Prior to 1987, generics were coming on the market within five to seven years after the appearance of the originator product. The first generic would typically be priced about 25 percent lower than the brand-name product, and when there were three or four generics the price differential would be 50 percent (17) . In the absence of compulsory licensing, the originator product typically is in a monopoly situation for about 10 to 12 years. (The first 8 to 10 years of patent life are used up in clinical trials and the drug approval process.) Not only has Bill C-91 delayed the entry of generic products by about seven years, but by the time they appear, sales of the brandname drug are usually starting to decline and therefore savings that result from the substitution of generic for brand-name products are less.
The delay in the entry of generics is associated with a continual climb in spending on prescription drugs. Between 1975 and 1987, prescription drugs went from accounting for 6.3 percent of the health care dollar to 7.0 percent, taking up an additional 0.06 percent of health care spending per annum; in comparison, between 1987 and 2001 spending on drugs rose from 7.0 to 12.0 percent, a rise of 0.36 percent annually and a six-fold increase over the previous period (18) ( Figure 1 ).
INDUSTRY'S ARGUMENT FOR EXPANDED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION
The crux of the industry's argument for stronger intellectual property rights protection is that it needs the time to recoup its investments in order to be able to afford the costs entailed in the research and development of new drugs, Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Rights / 241 drugs that may be more expensive than existing ones but are also more effective and/or safe.
Profit Levels
If the industry's message is that it needs a longer period to recover its investment, then a natural starting place is to look at how profitable or unprofitable it has been. According to Statistics Canada figures, in the mid 1990s, the profit levels in Canada in the pharmaceutical industry were robust compared with those in other "high-tech" industries, as measured by the rate of return on capital employed: the pharmaceutical industry stood at 16 percent, compared with 14 percent for computer equipment, 10 percent for electronic products, and 9 percent for telecommunications carriers (19) .
There are often arguments that accounting profits are poor measures of the real rate of return on investment in the pharmaceutical industry. This question was investigated in the early 1990s by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, which concluded that while other methods of calculating profits do lower the differential between the drug makers and other industries, levels are still high enough to have made the industry a relatively lucrative investment (20) . Despite what the industry regards as inadequate patent protection, it was still highly profitable in Canada.
The Value of New Drugs
The PMPRB places drugs into one of three categories in order to decide on the highest allowable price. Category 1 is a line extension (usually a new strength of an existing medication); category 2, a substantial therapeutic improvement or a breakthrough product (the first medication to treat an illness); and category 3, a new product or a new dosage form of an existing medicine that provides moderate, little, or no improvement over existing medicines. From 1996 to 2000, 455 new patented drugs were introduced into Canada. Out of that total, 204 were line extensions, 226 were in category 3, and 25 (just over 5 percent of the total) were category 2-major improvements or breakthroughs (21) .
The Canadian pharmaceutical industry argues that PMPRB categorizations are merely for determining prices and are not a reflection of actual therapeutic value. But the same critique cannot be leveled against the evaluations made by the French drug bulletin, La revue Prescrire. Since 1981 Prescrire has been assessing the value of new drugs and new indications for older drugs on the French market. Over a 21-year period it has looked at 2,693 drugs. A mere seven have been rated a major therapeutic innovation in an area where no treatment was previously available, and another 73 were considered important therapeutic innovations but with certain limitations. By far the majority (1,780) were categorized as either superfluous new products or new indications for older drugs that did not add to the clinical possibilities offered by previously available products (22).
The Cost of Developing New Drugs
The most recent study to look at this question reports that for drugs first tested in humans between 1983 and 1994, the mean cost to bring them to market was U.S.$802 million (23) . It should be noted that these are not costs that need to be recovered solely through Canadian sales. Canada represents about 2 percent of the world pharmaceutical market in sales, and therefore a reasonable expectation is that about U.S.$16 million, or 2 percent of overall research and development expenditures, should be recouped in Canada. Beyond the question of how much Canadians should contribute to R&D costs, there are also fundamental points of dispute around DiMasi and coauthors' figure (23) . To begin with, the data they used were derived from information selfreported by drug companies, and there is no independent way to verify this information. Second, the $802 million amount represents the costs for only one type of drug-new chemical entities (drugs containing ingredients never marketed before)-and excludes drugs that are combinations of previously available medications and reformulations of existing products (e.g., new dosage forms). About 30 percent of R&D expenditures go toward bringing this latter type of drug to market (24) . Also, any drugs developed with funding from non-industry sources, such as government, hospitals, foundations, or medical schools, were not included in the sample of products used by DiMasi and colleagues. In computing the cost of developing new drugs, it is important to incorporate expenses for products that fail in the development stage. While many drugs are withdrawn for safety reasons or because of lack of effectiveness, at least 20 percent of drugs in the development stage are terminated for commercial reasons, that is, because they are not deemed profitable enough. As Frank (24) points out, changes in revenue expectations would lead to different decisions about drug terminations and would thus change the average cost figure. Finally, over half of the amount that DiMasi and coauthors calculate is opportunity costs. The estimated out-of-pocket cash expenses by the drug companies are $403 million.
Before DiMasi and coauthors' latest study, the pharmaceutical industry was estimating the cost of developing a new drug at about $500 million. Public Citizen Congress Watch in the United States looked at the assumptions behind that amount and came up with its own figure of an after-tax cash outlay of just $110 million (25) . Public Citizen's calculations have in turn been attacked by the pharmaceutical industry (26) . The vigorous debate on what the true figure really is shows that the $802 million amount cannot be blindly accepted.
How Long Is the Actual Monopoly Period?
The patent term in Canada is 20 years from the date of filing, but the effective monopoly time for brand-name drugs is shorter than this owing to the time required for a product to proceed through the development and regulatory approval stages. One of the arguments that Rx&D advances for increases in the patent protection period is that the maximum effective patent life in Canada is 10 years, compared with about 14 in the United States and 15 in the European Union and Japan (27) . How Rx&D arrives at the 10-year figure is unclear. Back in 1993 it was also claiming 10 years of effective patent protection (28) . In 1993, drug approval times were 1,044 days, compared with 717 days in 2001-or almost a year longer (29) . The decrease of a year was not reflected in the patent life that Rx&D presented.
It might be postulated that the one-year gain in approval time was taken up by longer clinical testing times, but that does not seem to be the case. At most, times from the start of clinical testing to the filing of a submission for approval increased by 3.5 months during the 1990s (23) . In the United States, effective patent life for selected drugs is between 13.9 and 15.4 years (30) . Some of that time is accounted for by provisions not available in Canada (patent term restoration = 2.3 years, pediatric exclusivity = 0.5 years), and approval times are about 0.8 years faster in the United States. Based on these figures, Canadian effective patent times should be 10.3 to 11.8 years, a number roughly consistent with the calculation that uses shorter approval times. The Canadian government does not independently collect information on this subject and so, in the absence of reliable numbers, the industry's argument for longer patent protection becomes much less compelling.
CURRENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT ISSUES

Recent Rulings by the World Trade Organization
One of the key elements that went into forming the WTO was the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. The impact of the TRIPS agreement is still being felt in Canada. Two separate challenges were launched against Canada in the WTO in recent years. The European Union complained about a provision in the Canadian patent law that allowed generic drug companies to begin testing, manufacturing, and stockpiling drugs for sale before patents expired. When Canada changed from a 17-to a 20-year patent term for drugs approved after October 1, 1989, the change was not made retroactive. The United States charged that a group of about 30 drugs that were patented before October 1989 should receive an additional three years of patent life. (The complaint by the United States did not cover just drugs but patents on all products that were granted before October 1989 and were still valid.)
Canada lost the case filed by the United States (31) , and the WTO also ruled that generics companies could not stockpile drugs for sale before the patent expired (32) . As a result of these decisions, in mid 2001, Canadian patent laws were amended once more with the passage of Bill S-17. The extension of the patent term on the 30 drugs is expected to add an estimated $40 million to Canada's prescription drug costs, according to the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA), the lobbying arm of the generics industry (33) . Prohibiting generics companies from stockpiling drugs until the patent expires will delay the marketing of generic products for weeks. A report prepared for the CGPA that looked at a group of 34 generic products estimated that each day of delay in reaching the market was associated with a cost of almost $5,500 per product (34) .
Further IPR Disputes
Despite the passage of S-17 and other changes that Canada has made to its patent laws in the wake of the FTA, NAFTA, and TRIPS, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the main organization of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, continues to complain that a variety of problems represent significant commercial barriers for its membership. Although PhRMA is concerned about price controls, regulatory delays, and restrictions on provincial formulary listings, its main objection remains Canadian protection of IPRs. In this regard, PhRMA highlights what it sees as inadequate protection of registration data (data submitted to show that a drug is safe and effective) and the Notice of Compliance (NOC) "Linkage" Regulations (35) .
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Not only does PhRMA object to these practices because of their economic implications in Canada, but it notes that if "a major developed country such as Canada is failing and continues to fail to comply with the spirit and letter of TRIPS, this will set a negative example for developing countries. Canadian practices that create a dangerous precedent should be addressed before they are adopted in other jurisdictions" (35) . A cynical interpretation of this statement could be that the industry should make Canada "knuckle under" before other countries get "uppity."
Registration Data
To gain marketing approval, generics companies typically demonstrate that their product is bioequivalent to a patented product (i.e., that the generic is chemically similar and works the same in the human body) and then rely on the patented product's safety data to earn approval. Rx&D notes that Canada protects registration data for five years, compared with six to ten years in Europe, depending on the particular regulatory agency. Moreover, according to Rx&D, Canada has a "practice of accepting drug submissions from generic manufacturers that rely upon the innovator's data within the allotted five year period." Rx&D contends that policy "effectively undermines the intent of the current data protection provisions" (4) . (Data protection is further discussed below.)
Rx&D's criticisms are echoed by its sister organization in the United States. Based on PhRMA's reading of Article 39.3, Canada does not offer enough protection for the registration data. PhRMA argues that "Canadian authorities allow parties other than the right holder to effectively gain marketing approval in direct reliance of protected confidential data. This violates TRIPS Article 39.3 as it eliminates the TRIPS requirement to prevent 'unfair commercial use' of protected data. We urge the United States to move data protection to the top of the bilateral commercial agenda with Canada" (35) . PhRMA's view on data protection was echoed in the 2003 U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301 report: "The problems that originally caused Canada to be placed on the Watch List in 1995 remain largely unresolved. . . . Canada does not provide effective data exclusivity protections" (36) .
What Rx&D and PhRMA do not point out is that prolonged data protection periods mean that generic companies have to redo certain clinical tests to generate information that is already known. Not only does this delay the appearance of the generic product but it also wastes resources and subjects patients or volunteers to unnecessary risks in duplicating the safety data.
Notice of Compliance "Linkage" Regulations
The other major area of IPR where both Rx&D and PhRMA are aggressively trying to change Canadian policy is with respect to the NOC "Linkage" Regulations. Under these regulations, passed in 1993 and strengthened in 1998 and 1999, Health Canada cannot issue an NOC until all the relevant patents on a brand-name product have expired. As a result, when the generics company submits its application to get a product approved, it also sends a Notice of Allegation (NOA) to the patent holder claiming that no patents are being infringed. If the patent holder challenges the NOA, this automatically triggers a 24-month regulatory stay that prevents the Minister of Health from granting approval for the generic, and the matter then may proceed to a court hearing. The stay expires either at the end of the 24 months, when the patent expires, or when the court case is decided, whichever comes first.
PhRMA's position is that while these linkage regulations could provide the "basis for effective protection of pharmaceutical patent owners' rights as required under TRIPS and NAFTA . . . experience suggests that Health Canada is taking steps to avoid the necessary application of the regulations" (35) . Among other things, PhRMA claims that Health Canada has been inconsistent in its policies and practices relating to the listing and delisting of brand-name companies' patents and in requiring generics companies to send an NOA; that Health Canada is continually and systematically limiting further the types of patents that can be listed on the Patent Register; that Canadian courts fail to provide effective recourse in cases where an NOC is issued for an infringing generic medicine; and that ultimately Canadian courts are not applying standards required of them under NAFTA and TRIPS. PhRMA's ultimate conclusion is that the U.S. Trade Representative "should attach high priority to remedying this situation."
The effect of these linkage regulations is a subject of intense disagreement between the generics and brand-name companies. The CGPA claims that "not only is this abuse of Canada's patent regime extremely harmful to Canada's generic pharmaceutical industry, the Canadian public loses out on millions of dollars in savings by having to pay for the higher-priced brand-name version for an extended period of time. The delays caused by these needless court battles have cost Canadians, their governments and private insurers hundreds of millions of dollars" (37) . It also says that since the regulations were changed in 1998, the generics companies have won 80 percent of the court cases.
Rx&D counters that these regulations are necessary because (27):
generics do not have to concern themselves with a possible interlocutory injunction to prevent infringing sales once an infringing generic product is on the market. Statistics show that this remedy is available in pharmaceutical cases approximately half as often as in other industry patent cases. Indeed, as a result of the inability of pharmaceutical patentees to obtain interlocutory injunctions to prevent the complete destruction of their intellectual property rights and market share, the "linkage" regulations are the only means for Canada to meet its international obligations to provide an effective enforcement mechanism for patents.
Rx&D also points out that the 80 percent success rate for the generics companies translates into four out of five cases won, and it presents its own figure showing that generic and patentee "wins" about balance each other out. Thus, the way that Rx&D calculates the outcomes appears to show a roughly equal split in wins, but an examination of this figure reveals that the brand-name companies are also not above playing around with numbers. There are 125 cases that had no hearing; in 20 cases where the NOA was withdrawn, this is counted as a win for the patentee, but the 100 cases where the innovator either accepted the NOA or the case was otherwise settled are not counted as wins for the generics companies (27) .
A second area of contention is the use of multiple patents to delay the appearance of a generic product. The CGPA maintains that the brand-name companies continually list new patents on a product, each of which can trigger a new NOA and an additional stay on the appearance of a generic. In this way, competition is delayed (37) .
The brand-name companies dispute this interpretation. Their position is that there is always ongoing research into drugs and, naturally, new patents will be filed to reflect improvements, such as moving from a three-pill-a-day regimen to once-a-day dosing. The multinationals say that in 95 percent of cases, all subsequent patents are issued within ten years of the initial patent and therefore all patents may be addressed in the same linkage proceeding. But if the effective patent life is only ten years, as Rx&D claims, then new patents are being filed as old ones expire. Even if patents are a couple of years longer there can still be overlapping 24-month stays, depending on when the generics company files for an NOC. According to Rx&D, in that situation all the generics companies have to do is market the older version of the product on expiry of the original patent (27) . All of this is true, but it ignores the fact that the main reason for launching a new formulation of a drug is to switch doctors to that version before a generic is available, effectively undercutting the market for the generic. This marketing practice is something that brand-name companies spend millions of advertising dollars doing.
Finally, the only other country where there is a stay in the marketing of generics until patent issues are settled is the United States. Drug makers can receive an automatic injunction of up to 30 months. In October 2002, reacting to allegations of abuse of these injunctions, President George Bush announced that he would rewrite patent regulations to limit the brand-name companies to a single 30-month injunction on any one drug, ending the practice of filing multiple overlapping claims of patent infringement (38) .
THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS AGREEMENT
Negotiations are ongoing for a free trade agreement-FTAA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas-that would include all 34 countries of North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, except Cuba. Although most of the draft text is still bracketed, meaning that it is still subject to negotiations, there are elements in the text that, if enacted, would markedly affect IPRs in Canada.
Extension of Patent Term
Under Section 5, Article 8.2 (Part II), patent owners would be able to receive additional patent life if it took longer than four years to grant a patent (39) . However, in the case against Canada at the WTO filed by the European Union, the panel ruled that this type of claim for an extension of the patent term is not a "legitimate interest" within the meaning of the TRIPS agreement (40) . Although the draft FTAA agreement does not mention extending patents to take into account the regulatory approval time, this interpretation makes clear that this is also something that is not required by the TRIPS agreement.
Data Protection
Section 10, Article 1.2, establishes a minimum of five years of data protection (39) . NAFTA already mandates a five-year period of registration data protection, so on the surface what is being proposed in the FTAA does not appear to be any more onerous than the current requirements. However, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has put a specific interpretation on NAFTA Article 1711 on "Trade Secrets" (41):
When a generic manufacturer files an Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS), the safety and effectiveness of the generic product may be demonstrated by showing that the product is the pharmaceutical and bioequivalent of the innovator's product. If the generic manufacturer is able to do so solely by comparing its product with the innovator's product which is being publicly marketed, the Minister will not have to examine or rely upon confidential information filed as part of the innovator's New Drug Submission (NDS). In such case, the minimum five year market protection referred to in the regulation will not apply.
It is not clear that the same interpretation would be applied to the FTAA agreement article, and therefore its adoption could lead to a restriction in the use of registration data, with the consequences discussed above.
Linkage Requirements
Section 10, Article 1.5(a) (Part II), would effectively impose the equivalent of NOC Linkage Regulations on all signatories to the FTAA (39) . Right now, the linkage regulations are a Canadian requirement and can be altered by the federal government. Embedding them in the FTAA would mean that any move by Canada to unilaterally weaken or abolish them could be challenged in a trade tribunal under the FTAA. Once they became part of the FTAA, linkage provisions could be changed only by unanimous agreement of all parties, something to which the United States is unlikely to accede.
Compulsory Licensing
Finally, Section 5, Article 5.1(a) (Part II), would impose more stringent conditions than the TRIPS agreement requires for the granting of compulsory licenses (39) . The WTO Ministerial Declaration (Doha Declaration) on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health states, "Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted" (42) . At present, the Canadian government has decided to forgo the option of using compulsory licensing, but should it want to reverse that decision in the future, it would find its options severely limited by the proposed FTAA agreement. Under the current text, compulsory licenses would be restricted to three situations: "for public non-commercial purposes or in situations of a declared national emergency or other situations of extreme urgency" (38) .
HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISTORT
THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETPLACE For Canada, significant economic costs are associated with using the IPR system, be they in higher drug spending, more reliance on imports, or a divergence of the R&D budget away from basic research. This section takes a brief look at other ways in which the patent system warps the pharmaceutical marketplace.
As we saw earlier, the large majority of drugs produced through research led by the patent incentive do not represent any significant therapeutic advances. Industry largely engages in R&D of products that are aimed at carving out a share of a lucrative market. The result is drugs that are essentially minor variations on existing medications-for example, additions to the statin group of drugs for lowering cholesterol. Since most drugs offer little or no therapeutic advantage over existing remedies, it stands to reason that most of the money spent on R&D is going into products that will build market share not products that will necessarily result in significantly better health outcomes.
Baker and Chatani (43) itemize an additional five ways in which patent protection leads to wasteful rent-seeking behavior by pharmaceutical companies. In order to capture market share for their copycat drugs, companies spend about $1.7 billion in promotion in Canada and more than ten times that amount in the United States (44) . In 2000, in Canada, Merck spent more than $6.25 million promoting just one drug, Vioxx. More than a million samples were left in doctors' offices, and there were more than 1,000 pages of journal ads (45) .
Gaining a competitive edge on rival firms leads to a restriction in the sharing of research results and delays in publication of findings because of commercial concerns. Twenty-seven percent of faculty in university life science departments who received industry support delayed publication of their results for more than six months, compared with 17 percent of those without such support. Eighty-one percent of life science companies that have relationships with academic institutions reported keeping results secret for longer than necessary to obtain a patent (46) . Communication is the life blood of science. If communication is impeded, so is scientific research. Without knowing what others are doing, scientists may be needlessly repeating work.
There are direct legal costs associated with filing and protecting patents and indirect costs that result from successful efforts, such as "evergreening," that stall the marketing of generic drugs. When the Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment was about to release a report saying that all drugs in the statin group were equivalent, Bristol-Myers Squibb, makers of one of these drugs, objected to the release of the report and went to court to block its publication. The case was eventually thrown out, but not before the Coordinating Office spent 13 percent of its annual budget defending itself (47) . Lawyers' fees for Bristol-Myers Squibb are not known but must also have been substantial.
In the United States, the pharmaceutical industry employs more than 600 lobbyists and spent U.S.$78.1 million in 2001 partly to ensure that its views about IPRs were heard by politicians (48) . Industry in Canada is also into heavy political lobbying. Former deputy prime minister John Manley in his aborted run for the leadership of the Liberal party received tens of thousands of dollars in donations from a group of six pharmaceutical companies and Rx&D. According to another Liberal parliamentarian, Manley was a key backer of the brand-name pharmaceutical industry's interests in cabinet discussions and was "part of the Praetorian Guard of status quo on high drug prices" (49) .
The U.S. pharmaceutical companies fund a variety of consumers' and patients' groups that appear to independently support positions favorable to the industry. During the 2002 U.S. elections, the United Seniors Association received more than U.S.$10 million from the drug companies to spend on television advertisements. In the 2000 elections, Citizens for Better Medicare, at its peak, was spending more than U.S.$1 million a week on advertisements-all of it paid for by PhRMA, the industry trade association (50) .
WHERE DOES CANADA GO FROM HERE?
If we accept the argument that intellectual property rights are necessary for the development of new pharmaceuticals, and for the moment we will, then the question becomes, How much patent time is required to ensure that companies continue to invest in new drug R&D? In order to estimate the appropriate period of patent protection we need to know the actual cost of bringing a new drug to market. Recall that the DiMasi and colleagues' figure (23) comes from self-reported industry data. The only attempt to engage in an independent examination of industry information came during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, sought financial data that would allow it to estimate research, development, marketing, promotion, and distribution costs for individual products. The drug companies objected on the grounds that the confidentiality of their cost and other data could not be protected. Ultimately the dispute went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled that the General Accounting Office was not authorized to collect this type of information (20) . The end result is that we have to rely on the drug companies to accurately report their R&D costs. Both the former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine and a staff report from the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging suggest that some of the research and development budget is for marketing research (51, 52) ; moreover the Senate report charges that postmarketing studies aimed at promoting unapproved uses of drugs are disguised as research (52) . In Canada, how is the government going to make decisions without having the proper information?
A more fundamental question is, What is the role of the patent system in the area of pharmaceuticals? Patents are said to stimulate economic activity, to lead to the development of products that then compete on prices with established drugs, and finally, and most fundamentally, to generate the profits necessary for the research and development of new innovative therapeutic products. In the Canadian context, strengthening IPRs has not achieved any of these objectives. While there is more R&D in Canada now than in the mid 1980s, it is declining as a percentage of the sales dollar; the Canadian trade balance in pharmaceuticals is deteriorating, and overall employment in the brand-name sector is no better than it was in 1990. Spending on pharmaceuticals over the past decade and a half has increased significantly, and the price of a prescription for patented medications has been rising by more than 6 percent per annum. Finally, although the pharmaceutical companies continue to bring new drugs onto the market, the vast majority do not bring any therapeutic gain.
Reintroducing compulsory licensing or abolishing the Notice of Compliance regulations would probably help control prices by leading to the earlier introduction of generics, with the follow-on of stimulating activity in the generic drug sector. But neither measure would do anything about redirecting research into therapeutically productive areas, nor would these changes alter the ways in which the patent system distorts the pharmaceutical marketplace. Without a fundamental realigning of R&D priorities, lower prices and more economic activity will just mean lower prices for mostly me-too drugs and the continuation of the activities that generate additional costs. It's time for much bolder thinking.
A 2002 report from the Center for Economic and Policy Research argues that as research costs rise, they will reach a point where public/not-for-profit funding will be more efficient than patent-supported research (43):
The reason for this is that patents effectively allow private firms to charge an excise tax-the mark-up allowed by the patent monopoly-on prescription drugs. The economic distortions associated with such a tax are proportional to the square of the mark-up. Therefore, if drug companies have to charge twice as high a mark-up in order to cover their research costs, then the size of the economic distortions will be multiplied fourfold. This means that even if patent supported research is somewhat more efficient than public/non-profit supported research on a dollar for dollar basis, at some point the distortions created by the patent mark-up must eventually offset this greater efficiency.
Baker and Chatani (43) go on to show that the amount of money that would be needed if all pharmaceutical R&D were to be funded through the public system would be more than offset by the lower drug prices that would result from the absence of the patent system. Their numbers come from the U.S. context and may or may not apply equally well in Canada, but they should serve to start a debate about whether the patent system is the best way to fund pharmaceutical R&D.
Note -An earlier version of this article was published by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
